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A remarkable political consistency 
Given declarations by successive administrations that criminal policy is informed by 
evidence of effectiveness, there is a curious divide on the issue of the age of criminal 
responsibility between the Conservative/ Liberal Democrat coalition government (and its 
New Labour predecessor) and a significant (and growing) number of those who are, it might 
be thought, well placed to determine what the evidence says. While it could, with some 
legitimacy, be contended that the same phenomenon can be discerned in other areas of 
social policy, the tension in relation to this issue is particularly stark.  
 
The age of which children are deemed to be criminally liable in England and Wales is, at ten 
years of age, extremely low by international standards. Indeed, excluding other jurisdictions 
within the United Kingdom, it is the lowest in the European Union (Bateman, 2012a). Beyond 
European borders, England and Wales is also an outlier by this measure. According to one 
extensive international study, the average (mode) age of criminal responsibility across 90 
jurisdictions was fourteen years (Hazel, 2008). Questioned in Parliament on this issue, the 
government has conceded that formal criminalisation of children occurs earlier in England 
and Wales than in much of the rest of the world, but nonetheless maintains that the current 
arrangement ‘accurately reflects what is required by our justice system’ (McNally, 2013). 
This answer reflects a long-standing position on the part of government that has survived 
several changes of administration in the face of what has been described by the 
Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (2012) as an ‘increasing momentum from a 
wide range of organisations to raise the minimum age of criminal responsibility’. 
 
Examples of that momentum are not hard to come by. In December 2012, the Guardian 
featured a letter signed by more than fifty experts (Hibbert et al, 2012) arguing that the 
current age of criminal responsibility was contrary to the evidence and represented an 
infringement of children’s rights. On the same day, the same signatories endorsed an open 
letter to the Justice Secretary, accompanied by a newly published report by the National 
Association for Youth Justice (Bateman, 2012a), that petitioned the government to review its 
position. This initiative followed closely on public criticism of the low age of criminal 
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responsibility by, among others, the Joint Committee on Human Rights (2009), the 
Children’s Commissioner for England (Thompson, 2010), Barnardo’s (2010), the All Party 
Parliamentary Group for Children (2010), the Centre for Social Justice (2012) and the All 
Party Parliamentary Group on Women in the Penal System (2012). 
 
This emerging consensus extends, moreover, to the academic community. In 2013, a special 
edition of Youth justice journal was devoted to analysis of the minimum age of criminal 
responsibility. Each of the four substantive articles on this topic, written from a range of 
disciplinary perspective, concluded that the government’s position was not compatible with 
the empirical or conceptual evidence (Delmage, 2013; Goldson, 2013; Lamb and Sim, 2013; 
McDiarmid, 2013).  
 
Significantly, Liberal Democrat policy on this issue is at odds with that of their Conservative 
partners, endorsing an increase in the age at which children are deemed to have criminal 
capacity to 14 years (Jack, 2014). Moreover, Lord McNally who, in the quotation cited above, 
defended the current age of criminal responsibility while a government minister, has, since 
becoming the Chair of the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales in March 2014, shifted 
position, indicating his personal support for a review of the existing arrangements 
(Bateman, 2014 forthcoming).  
 
The government response to this groundswell of pressure for change has been 
intransigence. Jeremy Wright, minister with responsibility for youth justice, declined to meet 
the National Association for Youth Justice to discuss the expert concerns noted above on the 
grounds that ‘children do know the difference between right and wrong at age 10’. Such an 
assessment closely echoed that offered by the incoming New Labour government some 
fifteen years earlier. ‘No More Excuses’, the 1997 youth justice White Paper, maintained that 
arguing that ten-year-olds could not discriminate between ‘naughtiness and serious 
wrongdoing’ was simply ‘contrary to common sense’ (Home Office, 1997: paragraph 4.4). 
Such remarkable political consistency is rare and it is difficult to think of any other issue in 
criminal justice policy where the main political parties have espoused the same position over 
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such a lengthy period. The stability of policy on the age of criminal responsibility is all the 
more notable given that, as will be described in due course, presuppositions in relation to 
youth justice more generally have shifted considerably in the interim.  
 
The purpose of the current paper is to attempt to provide an explanation of government 
reluctance to countenance change in the face of overwhelming evidence that change is long 
overdue. In so doing, it explores what the view of successive governments might imply for 
the construction of youth offending and the implications for how children in conflict with 
the law are presented in policy terms.  
 
The case for change  
The case in favour of a higher age of criminal responsibility has been made extensively 
elsewhere (Arthur, 2012; Bateman, 2012a; Goldson, 2009) and there is no intention to 
repeat the details of the argument here. Nonetheless an outline of the evidence base 
provides a useful context in which to locate the government’s disinclination towards reform.  
 
One set of arguments focuses on the extent to which holding children to account through 
the imposition of criminal sanction is an effective measure for preventing further offending.  
From this perspective, evidence suggests that prosecution has no beneficial impact at any 
stage (Kemp et al, 2002). The underlying explanation for that lack of positive impact is that 
the youth justice system is itself ‘criminogenic’ and contact with it tends to impede the 
process of desistance that occurs naturally with maturity (McAra and McVie, 2007). As Barry 
Goldson (2013: 122) has argued, a reduced age of criminal responsibility functions as ‘an 
apprenticeship for career criminality’.  
 
A second set of arguments deals with the circumstances under which it is legitimate to 
impute criminal culpability, which despite the government’s simplistic assertions, requires 
rather more than knowing the difference between right and wrong (Arthur, 2012). Whereas 
children know that, for instance, stealing is wrong from a very young age – in most cases 
well before the current age of criminal responsibility – that is not the same as a ‘self-
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generated understanding of what it means to do wrong’ (McDiarmid, 2013: 149). The latter 
involves a moral and ethical standpoint which the former does not, and it is for such reasons 
that membership of a jury, for instance, is not open to children from the point at which they 
are able to correctly identify behaviours which adult society counts as illegal (Bateman, 
2012a). It follows that the age at which criminal liability can be properly ascribed should be 
informed by developing cognitive capacity.  
 
In this context, recent advances in neuroscience have made a significant contribution to the 
debate. The frontal lobe of the brain, which is thought to be largely responsible for 
judgement, morality and decision-making, is subject to ‘greater change during adolescence 
than at any other time’ but is also one of the slowest areas of the brain to reach full maturity 
(Delmage, 2013: 106) which is not attained until ‘well in the period of young adulthood’ 
(Prior et al, 2011:35). Accordingly, by comparison with young adults, teenagers have a 
limited capacity for abstract thought. Moreover, since during this developmental phase parts 
of the brain responsible for the production of heightened emotional stimuli mature much 
earlier, adolescence is a period associated with a reduced ability for adopting the 
perspective of others, an increased propensity for risk taking and a disinterest in deferred 
gratification (The Royal Society, 2011). Teenagers’ subjective preferences are thus more 
likely to lead to behaviour that, from an adult vantage point, would be deemed ill judged. 
The application of adult standards of culpability is accordingly inappropriate.  
 
The imposition of criminal sanctions is moreover only justifiable to the extent that children 
are competent to take part in proceedings (Farmer, 2011). There is clear empirical evidence 
that understanding of some of the fundamental principles of the criminal justice process is 
less well developed in 14-15 year-olds than in 16-17 year-olds, who in turn function at a 
lower level in this regard than young adults (Grisso et al, 2003). Children below the age of 
17 years are also more likely to confess to something that they have not done than their 
adult equivalents (Redlich and Goodman, 2002). Cognitive functioning thus inhibits proper 
participation in proceedings until a point of maturation well above the current age of 
criminal responsibility.  
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A further set of arguments emanates from a children’s rights perspective. The United 
Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (2007: paragraph 32) has declared that 12 
years is ‘the absolute minimum’ age of criminal responsibility that is acceptable by 
international standards. As might be anticipated, the Committee has been consistently 
critical of the arrangements in England and Wales and recommended reform on the three 
occasions that it has reviewed the UK’s compliance with the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (Children’s Rights Alliance for England, 2013). The Government’s 
reluctance to accommodate such recommendations has elicited concern from the United 
Nations Committee against Torture (2013). 
 
Kathryn Hollingsworth (2013) has developed a sophisticated, and persuasive, rights based 
argument for increasing the age of criminal responsibility that points to a critical distinction 
between adult and children’s autonomy. Within the legal system children are not regarded 
as ‘fully autonomous rights-holders’ because childhood is conceived as a developmental 
phase during which ‘the assets necessary for full autonomy’ are accrued (Hollingsworth, 
2013: 1046). This stage requires, as a fundamental or ‘foundational’ right, protection from 
any policies that irreparably impede the process of preparation for the acquisition of full 
autonomy. Since on a variety of measures, it is clear that a low age of criminal responsibility 
has that negative effect, protecting a child’s foundational rights implies that the age at 
which criminal liability is attributed be raised considerably. The implications of this 
argument for the analysis developed in the current article are explored in due course. 
 
The government response 
The current age of criminal responsibility was established in 1963 by the Children and 
Young Persons Act of that year, which raised it from eight to ten years. It should not 
however be assumed that governments have been unremittingly hostile to any further 
movement in the period since. The first half of the twentieth century was characterised by 
regular upward shifts in the age at which children were liable to criminal processes (Arthur, 
2012), a tendency largely associated with the growing influence of a welfarist approach to 
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youth justice (Muncie, 2009). This trajectory culminated in the passage of the Children and 
Young Persons Act 1969 which contained provision to raise the age of criminal 
responsibility to fourteen years. However a change of government (from Labour to 
Conservative) ensured that this and, a range of other progressive measures that would have 
significantly reduced the ambit of - what was then known as - the juvenile justice system, 
were not implemented (Bottoms, 2002; Thorpe et al, 1980). Henceforth, the ascendancy of 
the welfare paradigm was rapidly superseded by a justice model that in its early years took a 
minimalistic, progressive, form before adopting a much tougher guise following a ‘punitive 
turn’ in the early 1990s (Muncie, 2008; Pitts, 2005). In this new climate, enthusiasm for 
further progress on the age of criminal responsibility abated: the relevant section of the 
1969 Act remained on the statute book until it was repealed by the Criminal Justice Act 
1991.  
 
Nonetheless, until 1998, the common law principle of ‘doli incapax’ continued to afford a 
modicum of protection to children above the age of criminal liability, by requiring the 
prosecution, in any case involving a child aged between ten and fourteen years, to 
demonstrate not just that he or she had committed the offence alleged, but also that he or 
she understood that it was seriously wrong as opposed to mischievous or naughty (Arthur, 
2012). In the tougher climate that prevailed during the early part of the 1990s, the 
contemporary relevance of the principle was considered by the courts. In 1996, the House of 
Lords confirmed that doli incapax should continue to apply and that any changes to it 
should be taken in the context of a wider review of responses to children’s offending, that 
might include a rise in age of criminal responsibility (Bandalli, 2000). However, the New 
Labour government formed the following year had little time for such learned opinion.  
 
Keen to demonstrate that there really should be ‘no more excuses’ for children who broke 
the law, in conformity with the title of their 1997 White Paper, the incoming government 
simply declared that the principle contradicted ‘common sense’ and legislated for its 
abolition in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. Implemented immediately on Royal Assent, 
the reform had an unambiguous and abrupt impact: in 1999, the number of ten to fourteen-
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year-olds receiving a formal youth justice sanction for an indictable offence was 29 percent 
higher than it had been in the year prior to implementation. The equivalent figures for older 
children saw a fall over the same period (Bateman, 2012a). For practical purposes, the 
abolition of doli incapax thus represented a lowering of the age of criminal responsibility.  
 
Ironically, the government’s justification to the United Nations Committee on the Rights of 
the Child for the abandonment of the 700 year old presumption that, unless it could be 
proved otherwise, children under 14 were not capable of criminal intent, was given a 
children’s rights veneer. The purpose, it was claimed, was to ensure that: 
‘if a child has begun to offend, they are entitled to the earliest possible intervention 
to address that offending behaviour and eliminate its causes. The changes will also 
have the result of putting all juveniles on the same footing … and will contribute to 
the right of children … to develop responsibility for themselves’ (HM Government, 
1999). 
 
Thereafter any questioning of the low age at which a child could be criminalised was met, by 
both major political parties, with the familiar refrain that knowledge of right and wrong was 
so patently developed in children aged ten years as to obviate the need for further 
discussion. In 2012, for instance, Damian Green, Minister for Policing and Criminal Justice, 
answered a suggestion that, in order to comply with international obligations, the age of 
criminal responsibility be raised to 12 years with an assertion rather than a rationale, 
declaring that it was:  
‘entirely appropriate to hold children aged 10 and over to account for their actions, 
and to allow the criminal courts to decide on an effective punishment when an 
offence has been committed. It is important to communities, and particularly 
important to victims, to know that young people who offend will be dealt with  
appropriately’ (Green, 2012).  
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A partial explanation 
As the commitment to a welfarist youth justice stalled during the 1970s, the political 
enthusiasm for any further upward movement in the age of criminal responsibility 
correspondingly waned, as evidenced by the failure to implement the relevant provisions of 
the Children and Young Persons Act 1969. By the early 1990s, the emergence of a largely 
media driven ‘general anxiety’ (Muncie, 2009: 7) about the extent of youth crime, led to a 
political questioning of the philosophy of minimum necessary intervention that had 
supplanted the welfare ethos (Williams, 1993; Pitts, 2005), ensuring that the repeal of the 
provisions of the 1969 Act attracted little political dissent. From 1993 onwards, that general 
unease acquired a viciously punitive dynamic that led to an increasing intolerance of 
children who broke the law and a raft of legislative changes – including the abolition of doli 
incapax – that would see greater numbers of children pulled into the ambit of the criminal 
justice system and a rapid escalation in the use of custody (Muncie, 1999; Bateman, 2012b). 
 
In this context, it is not unreasonable to see successive governments’ refusal to 
countenance a rise in the age of criminal responsibility as an unsurprising by product of the 
punitive turn. As the National Association for Youth Justice, for example, has argued that 
political rejection of reform ‘is motivated by an ideological commitment to appear tough on 
youth crime rather than a dispassionate review of the evidence’ (Bateman, 2000a: 2). There 
is undoubtedly merit in such an account, but it also has limitations.  
 
On election, New Labour was wedded to the notion that early induction to the youth justice 
system was necessary to ‘nip offending in the bud’ (Home Office, 1997: paragraph 5.15). 
Such a philosophy was consistent with theoretical notions of ‘zero tolerance’ to which the 
Blair government was instinctively drawn (Phoenix, 2008; Pitts, 2003) and played well with 
populist sentiment. The maintenance of a low age of criminal responsibility as a ‘common 
sense’ response to the problem of youth crime was to be expected even if it conflicted with 
the weight of evidence.  
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But the political ‘arms race’ that such populism reflected (Centre for Social Justice, 2012: 26) 
has since cooled to a form of détente and the presumption of early intervention has largely 
been displaced by a rediscovery of diversion (Creaney and Smith, 2014). In 2008, for 
reasons that are probably not entirely disconnected from the onset of financial crisis, New 
Labour’s Youth Crime Action Plan (Home Office, 2008), while ‘retaining a veneer of 
toughness’,  also signalled a dramatic shift in responses to children in conflict with the law 
(Smith, 2014: 58). The introduction of a target to reduce the number of children receiving a 
formal sanction for the first time (so called ‘first time entrants’ (FTEs)) by 20 percent by 
2020 was not obviously consistent with early formal intervention. Significantly, this shift 
enjoyed a political consensus as robust as that which had previously fixated on the necessity 
of toughness and presumptions of early induction to the criminal justice system. The 
performance measure survived the change of government to become one of the Coalition’s 
three high-level targets for youth justice (alongside reductions in the use of child 
imprisonments and reducing reoffending) (Ministry of Justice, 2010).      
 
The new target was accompanied by the emergence of a range of diversionary measures that 
provided alternatives to the criminal justice process, and that did not result in a criminal 
record. In due course, the Coalition would abolish the rigid ‘three strikes’ final warning 
system, introduced by the Crime and Disorder Act 1988, that had promoted net-widening, 
replacing it with a regime of youth cautioning that permitted greater flexibility and allowed 
the police increased discretion to take no further action (Hart, 2014). 
 
The scale, and significance, of the change is hard to overstate. The new target was met 
within the first twelve months of its introduction, and between 2008/09 and 2011/12 the 
number of FTEs to the youth justice system fell by 65 percent (Ministry of Justice / Youth 
Justice Board, 2014). This reduction has been largely responsible for an equally dramatic 
decline in the overall volume of children formally processed for offending. The number of 
substantive youth justice disposals imposed on a child for an indictable offence in 2012 was 
54 percent lower than the equivalent figure in 2008 (Ministry of Justice, 2013). The FTE 
initiative not only channelled significant numbers of children away from the youth justice 
11 
 
system, it was also a signifier of the reduced political significance attached to being tough 
on youth crime.  
 
But recent developments pose something of a paradox. The current administration has 
shown itself willing to preside over a youth justice system in which the number of 10 and 11 
year-olds receiving a formal disposal has fallen by more than two thirds in just two years, 
with just 1,175 children in that age group subject to criminal justice sanctions in 2012/13 
Ministry of Justice / Youth Justice Board, 2014). Indeed, it has actively promoted a strategy 
leading to that outcome and on the present trajectory further decline seems likely. How then 
are we to understand the continued political resistance to contemplating a rise in the age of 
criminal responsibility to even twelve years?   
 
Constructing visions of different childhoods 
In developing ‘a reasoned case’ for a heightened age of criminal responsibility, Barry 
Goldson points to what he terms the problem of ‘intra-jurisdictional integrity’ (Goldson, 
2009: 517). This consists in the tension between the age at which children are deemed 
capable of criminal intent and the thresholds at which other rights and safeguards are 
applied incrementally in the transition to adulthood. To take a few examples: children are 
precluded from any form of paid employment until the age of 13; they cannot consent to 
sex until they are 16, the age prior to which young people are also not allowed to buy a pet; 
provisional driving licences are not issued to persons below the age of 17 years; and before 
attaining the age of majority – 18 years - children are not permitted to apply for a credit 
card or a mortgage, go on active service in the armed forces, perform music professionally 
abroad, buy fireworks, get married without parental permission, vote, buy alcohol or 
tobacco, or sit on a jury (Bateman, 2012a). Furthermore, in recent years, the underlying 
trend has been to increase safeguards to a higher age, while correspondingly delaying the 
age at which adult type rights are enjoyed. Whether or not such increased regulatory 
provision is justifiable in its own terms, there is an obvious conceptual strain with 
attribution of adult-type responsibility from the age of ten years to children who infringe 
the criminal law.  
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Goldson contends that this strain poses a logical challenge for those who would maintain 
the status quo and asks:  
‘How can the ‘adultification’ of 10 year-old children in criminal proceedings be 
rendered legitimate when in every other area of law, the social rights and 
responsibilities that adulthood conveys are reserved for [older children]?’ (2009: 
518). 
In his account, the question is rhetorical, a device to highlight the anomalous position of 
children who come to the attention of youth justice agencies. But attempting an answer may 
nonetheless be revealing since it has potential to demonstrate how children and childhood 
are constructed differently according to their circumstances. 
 
Angels, devils and the underclass 
Julia Fionda (2005) has provided an insightful account of how the notion of innocence that is 
generally attached by adult society to childhood can easily give way to its opposite where 
individual children fail to live up to adult perceptions of what children should be like. This is 
particularly true, she argues, for those who engage in criminal activity since they have not 
simply transgressed the law, but also offended against normative expectations. Such 
children quickly lose their ‘angelic’ status and are ascribed to a deviant group of ‘devils’. 
This falsely dichotomous classification framework rigidly allocates children to discrete 
boxes, making no allowance for the fact that all children sometimes misbehave and that, for 
those who do offend, criminal activity is just one – usually a minor – dimension of who they 
are.  
 
While the dichotomy is misleading, it not only reflects contemporary public constructions of 
young people in conflict with the law, but also frames policy responses towards this group 
in a manner that tends to reinforce the very social exclusion of which the delinquent 
behaviour is often a manifestation (Fionda, 2005). From at least the mid-1990s, rights and 
safeguards have not been regarded as unconditional. As Tony Blair famously remarked:   
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‘The basis of this modern civic society is an ethic of mutual responsibility or duty. It 
is something for something. A society where we play by the rules’ (cited in 
Drakeford, 2001: 40).  
Children who break the law do not on this account play by the rules; as ‘devils’ they, in 
effect, give up the safeguards and protections that are typically available to other children 
who demonstrate the requisite compliance with adult expectations of innocence. The 
problem of intra-jurisdictional integrity is thus resolved: the age of criminal responsibility is 
considerably lower than other thresholds because the category of child to which the former 
applies is constructed in different terms that allow ‘adultification’ (Goldson, 2009: 518).  
 
This analysis might be taken one stage further. As noted above, law breaking by children is 
relatively commonplace, but the youth justice system deals with a small subset of 
delinquent behaviour whose defining characteristic is that it is committed by disadvantaged, 
working-class, youth (Yates, 2010). There is, moreover, a long history of representing those 
who come to the attention of the authorities as the disadvantaged of a particular sort. The 
Victorian distinction between the deserving and the undeserving poor was resurrected with a 
modern gloss in the second half of the twentieth as underclass theory, particularly the 
variety for which Charles Murray (1984) was chief protagonist, but whose essentials formed 
as part of the neo-conservative ideological assault that began some ten years earlier 
(Wilson, 1975).  
 
Permissiveness, a lack of discipline, family breakdown and welfare dependence had,  
according to this cannon of work, produced ‘a dependent, demoralised and dangerous 
underclass’ who were largely responsible for the recorded increases in crime (Muncie, 2009: 
143). The problem was not poverty per se, but certain categories of poor people who: 
‘didn’t just lack money they were defined by their behaviour. Their homes were 
littered and unkempt. The men in the family were unable to hold a job … 
Drunkenness was common. The children grew up ill schooled and ill behaved and 
contributed a disproportionate share of the local juvenile delinquents’ (Murray, 
1990: 1).  
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Significantly, given the point at which rises in the age of criminal responsibility stalled, such 
ideas already had a purchase on significant political figures during the early 1970s. For 
instance, in a speech delivered in 1974, Sir Keith Joseph, then a government spokesperson 
on Home Affairs contended that: 
‘Our human stock is threatened… a high and rising proportion of children are being 
born to mothers least fitted to bring children into the world and bring them up. They 
are born to mother who were first pregnant in adolescence in social classes 4 and 5. 
Many of these girls are unmarried, many are deserted or divorced or soon will be. 
Some are of low intelligence, most of low educational attainment. They are unlikely 
to be able to give children the stable emotional background, the consistent 
combination of love and firmness which are more important than riches. They are 
producing problem children, the future unmarried mothers, delinquents, denizens of 
our borstals, sub-normal educational establishments, prisons, hostels for drifters’ 
(Joseph, 1974). 
 
Traditional conservatism would no doubt have baulked at implementing the more 
progressive elements of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 which threatened to 
undermine the authority of the police and the courts. But it seems likely that the growing 
influence of neo-conservative philosophy strengthened the revolt against welfarism. The 
provision to raise the age of criminal responsibility was on this account an early casualty of 
the spread of ideas associated with underclass theory. In the interim period, such ideas have 
become more firmly embedded in the political consciousness, unquestioningly accepted by 
both main political parties as a major determinant of welfare policy (see for instance, Slater, 
2012).  
 
Accordingly, children in conflict with the law define themselves by their actions as part of 
the underclass who, by virtue of that classification, are not entitled to the protections 
generally associated with childhood. It is arguably for this reason that a low age of criminal 
responsibility is sacrosanct and resistance to reform so stubborn. As Michael Howard put it 
in 1993, when Home Secretary, children who offend become ‘arrogant … young hoodlums 
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… who are adult in everything but years’ (cited in Goldson, 2008: 263). One advantage of 
understanding matters in this way is that it is helps to explain why political intransigence 
has survived the erosion of penal punitivism. As diversion from the justice system has 
become more prevalent, the threshold of offending required to signify membership of the 
underclass has risen, but for children who cross it, the political response must continue to 
reflect their acquisition of a status that denies their childhood and reinforces their 
construction as undeserving ‘devils’ (Fionda, 2005).  
 
Concluding thoughts 
Kathryn Hollingsworth’s (2013) argument, outlined above, suggests that a case for raising 
the age of criminal responsibility can be made in terms of articulating children’s 
unconditional entitlement to ‘foundational rights’. Whatever the logical merits of that 
position, it ultimately runs up against the problem that, from a neo-liberal standpoint, 
children who behave in particular ways can legitimately be denied the rights that would 
ordinarily accrue by virtue of their status as non-adults. Arguments that appeal to evidence 
of effectiveness are similarly undermined by an ideological construction which locates 
criminal children firmly in the dangerous underclass that, as Keith Joseph put it, ‘threatens 
our human stock’.   
 
To the extent that the analysis developed above illuminates the question of why it has 
proved difficult to shift the political common sense on the appropriateness of a low age of 
criminal liability, making the case for raising it might need to involve, alongside 
consideration of children’s rights, cognitive development and the harms of early 
criminalisation, challenging the dominant representations of children who offend.  
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